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From its beginnings as a colonial alternative to the English debtors'
prisons, American bankruptcy law has been built on the twin foundations of
the discharge for the debtor and the equality of treatment for the debtor's
creditors.' These themes repeat throughout the bankruptcy law,2 both in the
statutory provisions promulgated by Congress and in the case law interpreting
the statutes.
The reasons for these principles are obvious. The discharge encourages
risk taking by affording the deserving debtor a fresh start in the event of
failure, and equality of treatment of creditors promotes a fair and orderly
liquidation of the debtor's assets in the event of insolvency. As Mr. Justice
Black noted over thirty-five years ago, "Historically one of the prime pur-
poses of the bankruptcy law has been to bring about a ratable distribution
among creditors of a bankrupt's assets; to protect the creditors from one
another."
3
Despite its role as a touchstone of bankruptcy law, equality of treatment
of creditors remains an elusive concept. Nowhere is it more elusive than in
reorganization cases. Unlike liquidation cases, which concern contests for
shares in a fixed pool of assets, reorganization cases are contests for shares in
an ongoing enterprise. The value of the debtor's assets becomes the starting
point rather than the ending of the contest, and the future value of the assets
or the earnings of the debtor may be as important as their present worth.
This inherent difference between liquidation and reorganization cases
creates a dynamic tension between the principles of equality and the process
of rehabilitation. Creditors of a debtor in reorganization will have different
needs and different relations to the debtor that affect the reorganization. For
example, some creditors will need cash immediately while others would pre-
fer to wait for a larger dividend later; some creditors will be able to profit from
future sales to a reorganized debtor while others will have no reason for further
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dealings with the debtor. In addition, the debtor or a creditor proposing a plan
of reorganization may wish to divide creditors to promote the plan. Since a
plan must be accepted by at least one class of affected creditors or interest
holders,4 the division of creditors into classes is critical, and the temptation to
gerrymander creditors to assure acceptance is often irresistible.
In light of this dynamic tension between principles and politics, it is
surprising that so little law or comment exists on the question of classifica-
tion of claims and interests.5 Classification of claims and interests within the
corporate reorganization context is more than a determination of the simi-
larity or difference in the nature of claims or interests. As Peter Coogan has
noted, it is a "strategically important task," bound up with the ultimate goal
of increasing the chances of obtaining class acceptances of the reorganization
plan.
Nonetheless, the present statute7 fails to provide clear standards to guide
the debtor in this task. The legislative history to the section on classification
advises that debtors must forge their way through case law existing at the time
the Bankruptcy Code was drafted to determine the appropriate criteria for the
division of creditors into classes. 8 Unfortunately for the debtor, "few im-
mutable principles" 9 exist that may be extracted with any consistency from
that case law. Under this formula one can only study classification problems
resolved under the prior Bankruptcy Act,'0 read with suspicion the recently
decided chapter 13 cases under the current Code, and venture a guess whether
and to what extent these cases will be applicable to chapter 11 classification
problems.
The question addressed by this Article concerns the criteria used for
classifying claims and interests within the context of corporate reorganiza-
tion. More specifically, it addresses the appropriate criteria for the division of
claims or interests into separate classes, and conversely, the appropriate
criteria for including a group of claims or interests in the same class.
To explore this question, a close reading of the relevant Bankruptcy
Code sections is imperative, as is a consideration of the prior Act sections and
the case law interpreting those sections. Beyond this analysis, an overview of
changes in bankruptcy law as a result of the enactment of the Code that have a
bearing on the classification issue is necessary. Finally, a review of recent
chapter 13 classification cases will afford a preview of emerging principles
and problems under chapter 11.
4. Bankruptcy Act of 1978, I1 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (Supp. IV 1980).
5. See Vihon, Classification of Unsecured Claims: Squaring a Circle?, 55 AM. BANKR. L.J. 143 (1980).
6. Coogan, Confirmation of a Plan Under Chapter 11, 32 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 301, 329 (1982).
7. Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-151326 (Supp. IV 1980).
8. H.R. REP. NO. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 406 (1977); S. REP. NO. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 118,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5904.
9. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 9.10, at 1595 (J. Moore 14th ed. 1978).
10. Bankruptcy Act of 1938, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1976) (amended 1978).
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I. STATUTORY CONSIDERATIONS
To begin, section 1122 of the Bankruptcy Code specifically provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a plan may place a claim
or an interest in a particular class only if such claim or interest is substantially
similar to the other claims or interests of such class.
(b) A plan may designate a separate class of claims consisting only of every un-
secured claim that is less than or reduced to an amount that the court approves
as reasonable and necessary for administrative convenience."
The first distinction subsection (a) draws is between claims and interests.
A plan proponent may place "substantially similar" claims in the same class
and "substantially similar" interests in the same class, but claims and in-
terests are inherently different and must be classified separately. "Claim"
describes a creditor's rights against the debtor; "interest" involves proprie-
tary rights in the debtor. 12 The second principle enunciated in subsection (a) is
that while claims or interests within a class must be "substantially similar" to
one another, no concomitant requirement exists that all claims or interests
which are "substantially similar" must be placed in the same class.'
3
Aside from these basics, the cryptic language of subsection (a) provides
few clues to the criteria to be used in the classification process, and the
accompanying legislative history has done little more than further muddy the
less than clear waters. The legislative history states in relevant part:
This section codifies current case law surrounding the classification of claims and
equity securities. It requires classification based on the nature of the claims or
interests classified, and permits inclusion of claims or interests in a particular class
only if the claim or interest being included is substantially similar to other claims or
interests of the class.' 4
Before turning to the "current case law" to which the legislative history
refers, a brief comparison with sections of the prior Act will prove helpful.
The provisions of the Act in each particular chapter were substantially
similar to one another. Section 197 of chapter X was derived from former
section 77B(c)(6), which provided that "the judge ... shall determine
... for the purposes of the plan and its acceptance, the division of creditors
and stockholders into classes according to the nature of their respective
claims and interests." 15
Section 197 changed little from section 77B; the word "stock" was sub-
stituted for the word "interests." However, section 197 was effectively
11. I1 U.S.C. § 1122 (Supp. IV 1980).
12. Standard Gas & Elec. Co. v. Taylor (In re Deep Rock Oil Corp.), 113 F.2d 266 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
311 U.S. 699 (1940).
13. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1122.03[l] (L. King 15th ed. 1982).
14. S. REP. NO. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 118, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787,
5904.
15. Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, 48 Stat. 911, 916 (amended 1938).
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superseded by Bankruptcy Rule 10-302, which provides as follows: "(a) Clas-
sification of Claims. For the purpose of the plan and its acceptance, the court
may fix, after hearing on such notice as it may direct, the division of creditors
and stockholders into classes according to the nature of their respective
claims and stock."16
Although rule 10-302 changed very little of section 197, the mandatory
"shall" that appeared in section 197 was softened to the permissive "may,"
and a provision for a hearing on the matter accompanied the judge's classifi-
cation determination.
Sections 351 of chapter XII7 and 452 of chapter XII' 8 paralleled one
another, as well as rule 10-302, with certain variations. Section 351 omitted the
"nature of their respective claims" language found in chapters X and XII, and
both sections failed to differentiate between claims and interests, as does
chapter X. 19 However, the language found in the permissive provisions of
section 357 was more explicit. It provided: "An arrangement within the mean-
ing of this chapter may include (1) provisions for treatment of unsecured debts
on a parity one with the other, or for the division of such debts into classes
and the treatment thereof in different ways or upon different
terms; .... ,2
Without more, this brief comparison between the applicable statutes re-
veals that section 1122(a) of the Code brought forward the distinction between
claims and interests from section 197 and rule 10-302 and took away the
court's independent power to designate classes. That power is now the ex-
clusive prerogative of the debtor and creditors. Since the statutory language
has been virtually replicated from chapter to chapter, the issue of classifica-
tion may be considered without particular regard for the chapter under which
the petition was filed and without regard for the difference between the chap-
ters.
Therefore, this analysis will commence with a review of a representative
sample of cases holding the separation of certain claims as unwarranted and of
the courts' concomitant reasons for combining claims in a single class.
II. SINGULAR CLASSIFICATIONS
In one of the early railroad reorganization cases, J.P. Morgan & Co. v.
Missouri Pacific Railroad,2' the court followed the letter of the statute when it
classified three similar claims in the same class. The statute in effect at the
16. FED. R. BANKR. P. 10-302.
17. I1 U.S.C. § 751 (1976) (repealed 1978).
18. 11 U.S.C. § 852 (1976) (repealed 1978).
19. This distinction was omitted because a chapter XI plan could deal only with unsecured claims and
because chapter XII relief was restricted to noncorporate debtors. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 12-3 advisory
committee note.
20. I1 U.S.C. § 757(l) (1976) (repealed 1978).
21. 85 F.2d 351 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 604 (1936).
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time prohibited separate classification "unless there be substantial differ-
ences in priorities, claims, or interests." 2
The appellant, J.P. Morgan & Company, held short-term promissory
notes of the debtor, which were secured by a combination of the railroad's
first and refunding five percent gold bonds and shares of gold stock. The other
two claimants grouped in the same class with Morgan both held similar short-
term promissory notes secured by the same type of collateral. One claimant's
notes were said to be secured by "shares of stock in sundry corporations and
notes and bonds other than Missouri Pacific notes and bonds and other col-
laterals." 23
Morgan attacked the classification on several grounds, including the dif-
ferences between its claims against the railroad and those of the other two
creditors. It also argued that classification ought to be made according to the
interests of the claimant rather than according to the nature of the claims.24
The court, however, failed to yield to Morgan's complaints of differences and
its interpretation of the word "interests." 25 Missouri Pacific Railroad has
been cited repeatedly26 for its interpretation of the phrase "nature of their
respective claims and stock" to deny classification based upon the nature of
the claimant or stockholder or his interest in the reorganization in the sense of
the claimant's bias, leanings, or relationship to the debtor.
While this case may not be persuasive authority for classification today,
since separate classes were only sanctioned when "substantial" differences
existed, it did establish that classification is based on the nature of the claim
and not on the bias of the claimant.
This distinction between the nature of the claim and the identity or nature
of the claimant was confirmed recently in the Bankruptcy Code case of In re
Martin's Point Ltd.27 In this case the debtor created a class of second-priority
secured creditors consisting of three creditors with equal-priority security
interests in the sole asset of the debtor, the Martin's Point Plantation. These
interests arose when the three prior joint-tenancy owners of the plantation
sold the property to the debtors and received separate purchase-money
promissory notes secured by a single second mortgage. 28
One of these three creditors, Dawson, objected to the classification
scheme and voted to reject the plan. Since the other two class members
amounted to more than half of the creditors of the class and their claims
collectively amounted to more than two-thirds of the claims, the class as a
22. 11 U.S.C. § 205(c)(7) (1976) (repealed 1978).
23. 85 F.2d 351, 352 (8th Cir. 1936).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Freeman v. Mulcahy, 250 F.2d 463, 477 (1st Cir. 1957); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v.
Champion Shoe Mach. Co., 109 F.2d 313, 316 (8th Cir. 1940).
27. 12 Bankr. 721 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981).
28. Id. at 724.
1982]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
whole accepted the plan under section 1126.29 Under the plan the class re-
ceived the debtor's interest in the plantation along with 13,000 shares of
Federal Land Bank stock in satisfaction of the indebtedness. Furthermore,
Dawson was given a choice of exchanging his interest in the plantation for
either $160,000 cash or $190,000 in the form of a promissory note. ° In effect,
the other class members offered to purchase Dawson's interest in the planta-
tion at his election.
Despite these options, Dawson objected to the classification of his claim
in the same class on the grounds that the other class members were also
equity security holders and, therefore, the holders of claims that were not
"substantially similar" to his claim. Dawson further argued that his claim
differed from the other two claims in his ability to seek a deficiency judgment
following a foreclosure sale.31
The court did not accept the deficiency judgment argument and noted
that the other claimants held only minimal limited partnership interests in the
debtor.32 More importantly, it held that even if Dawson's rights to a deficiency
differed, and even if the other claimants held significant partnership interests,
their secured claims were substantially similar and properly included in the
same class: "It is the 'nature' of their claims being classified together that is
significant, not the nature of other claims or interests a creditor may
have.... The code provides that in order for creditors to be classified to-
gether, their interest need be only substantially similar and not identical. ' 33
The latter principle is derived directly from Seidel v. Palisades-on-the-
Desplaines (In re Palisades-on-the-Desplaines),34 a leading section 77B case
decided by the Seventh Circuit. The facts of Palisades-on-the-Desplaines,
though somewhat complicated, may be summarized as follows: The debtor
was a common-law trust, the beneficial interests or ownership in which were
evidenced by certificates. The principal assets of the trust consisted of
twenty-two parcels of land, nineteen of which were encumbered by separate
purchase-money mortgages secured by separate trust deeds. One of these
nineteen parcels was purchased from the appellant, who held one of the
purchase-money mortgages secured by a separate trust deed.35
Three of the debtor's creditors filed an involuntary petition in bankruptcy
under section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, and nine months later the debtor
filed its proposed plan of reorganization. The court in its order of classifica-
tion of claims placed appellant's claim in Class A with that of the other
eighteen mortgagees who had separate and distinct collateral. As a result, the
appellant objected to the classification scheme and argued that the court
29. 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (Supp. IV 1980).
30. 12 Bankr. 721, 723-24 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981).
31. Id. at 725-26.
32. Id. at 727-29.
33. Id. at 727.
34. 89 F.2d 214 (7th Cir. 1937).
35. Id. at 215.
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should have placed appellant in a separate class apart from any class contain-
ing the holders of mortgages that were a first lien on other separate tracts of
land owned by the debtor.
36
In addressing this question and citing the relevant statutory section,37 the
Seventh Circuit concluded that the court had "broad latitude in its classifica-
tion of debtors [sic]." 38 In its words, "[S]uch classification, of course, should
not do substantial violence to any claimant's interest, nor should it uselessly
increase the number of classifications unless there be substantial differences
in the nature of the claims.",
39
In determining that the appellant's claim was not entitled to separate
classification, the court made an exception to the interpretation of the statute
as provided in a contemporary treatise on corporate reorganization. In the
words of the treatise:
All creditors of equal rank with claims against the same property should be
placed in the same class. This is natural, logical, and a simple basis of division.
Conversely, creditors of different ranks, or creditors of the same rank but
with claims against different properties, should be placed in different classes. The
owners of a mortgage which is a first lien on certain property should be in a class
other than one containing the owners of a mortgage which is a second lien on the
same property. So, also, the holders of a mortgage which is a first lien on certain
property should be in a class other than the one containing the holders of a
mortgage which is a first lien on other property.40
In making its exception to this rule, the court compared the similarities of
the claims as well as their differences:
All "Class A" claims are the same in the following respects: They are all secured
by first mortgages or trust deeds on real estate; the indebtedness in each is evi-
denced by a principal note or notes; the properties are all located in the same
locality; they form a part of a single project; they were purchased at approximately
the same time; the obligations mature at about the same time; and the remedy
afforded each holder for realization on his mortgage is the same. They differ in the
following respects: The trust deeds are liens on different and distinct parcels of
land; the values of the individual properties are different; the trust deeds secure
different amounts and are due at varying times; and the ratio of encumbrance to
41purchase price is different in each case.
After comparing the claims the court determined that the appellant was
not harmed by the classification. This may have been a major factor in the
court's refusal to create separate classes for each security instrument secured
by separate pieces of property. Even though the appellant's property was
more valuable than that of any of the other Class A claimants, the appellant
would receive almost three times his own valuation of the security if the plan
36. Id. at 215-16.
37. Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, § 1, 48 Stat. 911, 912 (amended 1938).
38. 89 F.2d 214, 217 (7th Cir. 1937).
39. Id.
40. 2 J. GERDES, CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS § 1045 (1936).
41. 89 F.2d 214, 217 (7th Cir. 1937).
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were consummated successfully. If the plan were not consummated, the ap-
pellant still would receive the security without the necessity of foreclosure.
While the arrangement regarding each mortgage holder was the same, the
ultimate distributions differed. The reorganization plan provided that deeds
were to be executed to the persons holding mortgages in consideration for the
cancellation of those mortgages. Simultaneously, the recipients of the deeds
would individually execute contracts with another company under the terms
of which this company would purchase the real property from the then owners
at prices equal to seventy percent of the amount of the principal and interest
due at the time of confirmation of the plan.42
The court did not feel that this factor or any other differences cited were
sufficient to warrant separate classifications, despite the generally accepted
rules that real property is unique and that liens on different properties require
separate classification. In the court's words, classification was effected
"according to the nature, or pertinent characteristics, of the respective claims
and interests." 43
Thus, just as a definable species began to emerge, a mutant developed. It
is an exception to the general belief that all separate parcels of real estate are
inherently unique. It is also an acknowledged exception to the general rule
that creditors of the same rank but with claims against different properties
should be placed in different classes. New strains of this mutant already have
appeared in chapter 13 cases 44 and may yet appear in chapter 11 reorganiza-
tions.
As a result of this general rule, most classification problems center
around the further division of unsecured claims or the denial of further clas-
sification. As Collier on Bankruptcy succinctly notes: "The fact that the
[unsecured] claims may take various forms-as, for example, notes, ac-
counts, written contracts, torts or the like-will not ordinarily compel sepa-
rate classification since an unsecured indebtedness or liability is the common
denominator of all.""45
One example of court denial of further classification is the oft-cited case
of Scherk v. Newton (In re Rocky Mountain Fuel Co.).46 In this case a debtor
experienced financial difficulties for many years and, in an attempt to bail
itself out, proposed a voluntary plan for a reduction in interest rates on its
bonds. Ninety-three percent of the outstanding bondholders assented to the
plan; however, some of the nonassenting bondholders instituted actions
against the debtor to recover the principal of their bonds and the accrued
interest. As a result, the debtor was forced to file a petition for reorganization
under chapter X. 47
42. Id. at 217-18.
43. Id. at 218.
44. See infra text accompanying notes 192-208.
45. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 9.13(1) (J. Moore 14th ed. 1978).
46. 152 F.2d 747 (10th Cir. 1945).
47. Id. at 748-49.
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The court of appeals affirmed the district court's classification of claims,
which placed both assenting and nonassenting bondholders in the same class.
This decision was based not only on the equities of the situation but also on
provisions in the trust indenture that provided for parity of treatment between
holders of all the bonds and coupons, despite the consent by some to a
reduction in interest and an extension of maturity of the principal.4
In one of the classic statements on classification the court acknowledged
that "[c]lassification is simply a method of recognizing difference in rights of
creditors which calls for difference in treathment. '
49
Another example of court denial of separate classification is In re
Hudson-Ross, Inc.,50 in which the court grappled with this problem while
reviewing the referee's order approving the debtor's chapter XI plan of ar-
rangement. Under the proposed plan all unsecured merchandise creditors
were to be paid in full except for ten major trade creditors. These ten creditors
were placed in a separate class slated to receive thirty-five percent of their
May 1, 1958, claims due and unpaid, as well as payment in full for indebted-
ness subsequently incurred. This difference in treatment and separate classi-
fication arose from an earlier extension agreement entered into between the
debtor and the ten creditors to liquidate the past indebtedness owing to these
creditors.5 '
Since nothing in the extension agreement discharged the debtor's obliga-
tion to those creditors or evidenced any intention on the creditors' part to be
subordinated to other creditors, the court determined that no justification
existed for the separation of the creditors into two classes. In discussing this
problem the court opined:
The Bankruptcy Act sanctions a division of creditors into classes and a treatment
thereof in different ways or upon different terms. Such classification, however,
must be necessary and proper and made on a reasonable basis in order that the
arrangement be for the best interests of all creditors. Ordinarily, a creditor is not
entitled to better treatment merely because he holds a small claim rather than a
large one.
52
The court, therefore, held that the separation of unsecured creditors into
two separate classes was not made on any reasonable basis and that it was
arbitrary and discriminatory. The court set aside the referee's order confirm-
ing the plan of arrangement.53
Cleaving to this point of view, the court in In re Los Angeles Land &
Investments, Ltd.5 4 issued one of the classic statements defining the nature of
a claim under the Bankruptcy Act:
48. Id. at 749-51.
49. Id. at 750.
50. 175 F. Supp. 111 (N.D. I11. 1959).
51. Id. at 112.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 114-15.
54. 282 F. Supp. 448 (D. Hawaii 1968), affd, 447 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1971).
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The courts recognize that the word "nature" is used in no technical sense in
law but is used in its ordinary common vernacular, wherein it means kind, sort,
species or character. Where the differences are in the rates of interest, in the
amounts, in the dates of maturity, in names of payees, the manner in which the
claim arose and such other minor details, they cannot affect the "nature," i.e., the
kind of claim, otherwise a separate class would have to be provided for nearly
every type of situation which would be an unthinkable calamity when the object
and aim of the statute is regarded. 55
The court went on to opine that only under special circumstances may
unsecured creditors be divided into separate classes. On the basis of these
principles the court accepted the general unsecured creditor classification
recommended by the trustee, which included "holders of promissory notes
which are unsecured, open account creditors for services rendered or ma-
terials delivered, and holders of contracts for sale of real estate and/or in-
vestment contracts to the extent of payment made plus interest thereon prior
to the date of filing of the petition.-
56
It accepted this singular classification of a variety of unsecured creditors
because:
These categories of unsecured claims are of the same kind, sort or character, the
"nature" varies in only minor details concerning primarily the manner in which
they arose. The class in its entirety has the basic "nature" of all of them being the
holder of an unsecured indebtedness or liability which factor is "the common
denominator of all." There does not appear to be any justification to fragment the
classification and uselessly increase their number where there is no substantial
differentiation in the "nature" of their claims to justify such a decision.57
With this statement the Ninth Circuit returned to the dynamic tension
between principles of equality and the politics of the reorganization process
by introducing one further consideration into the classification dilemma:
claims classification from the practical standpoint. For example, under gen-
eral classification principles one hundred pieces of equipment subject to
separate first liens theoretically should be classified separately. However, the
mechanical problems of this separation may prove unwieldy. For this reason
the combination of substantially different claims may be advisable when
separation would greatly increase the number of classes. When separation of
claims has not threatened a drastic increase in the number of classes and
sufficient justification has existed, many courts have been willing to allow
separate classification, as the next set of cases demonstrates.
III. SEPARATE CLASSIFICATIONS
As previously noted, in most situations separate classifications are cre-
ated when the collateral securing each claim differs. This follows from the
general rule that the legal character or effect of a claim relative to the debtor's
55. Id. at 454.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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assets determines the classification scheme.58 Bound up with this determina-
tion, however, are subordination considerations, voting manipulation con-
cerns, and different treatment to be accorded creditors who are in pari
passu.59 As is always the case in bankruptcy law, the courts' holdings inevit-
ably are colored by the facts of each case, which warns one that a principle
enunciated in one case may not necessarily be relied upon in another fact
situation.
A. Subordination Considerations: Equitable and Otherwise
While classification in early decisions under the Chandler Act6° pro-
ceeded on the basis of the absolute priority rule announced in Northern
Pacific Railway v. Boyd,6' this rule always was subject to the doctrine that the
reorganization court may subordinate, postpone, or classify separately for
different treatment particular claims of a certain group on the basis of equi-
table considerations invoked by the particular facts. 62 Thus, whether equi-
table subordination has formally occurred, equitable considerations frequent-
ly have played an important part in the classification process, as the following
cases demonstrate.
A prime example of affording preferred status to a group of creditors
based upon equitable considerations is Dudley v. Mealey.63 In that case the
court granted priority status to a group of unsecured creditors who had furn-
ished supplies to the hotel debtor for a short time preceding the receivership.
Since these creditors furnished the goods and services necessary to keep the
hotel open, the court deemed them proper preferred claims and separately
classified them from the other unsecured creditors.64 This nonstatutory prior-
ity scheme was drawn from the "six months rule" adopted in many railroad
reorganization cases,65 which was also a nonstatutory adjustment of priorities,
designed by the courts to keep insolvent railroads running. Affording this type
of priority to creditors providing continuing services to a debtor is also a
common theme in contemporary chapter 13 cases and will be explored later.
A more recent example of classification and distribution in which equity
played its hand was the chapter XII case of Brinkley v. Chase Manhattan
Mortgage & Trust Co. (In re LeBlanc).66 The classification scheme in this real
property arrangement placed unsecured creditors in three classes. Small trade
58. See J.P. Morgan & Co. v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 85 F.2d 351 (8th Cir. 1936); In re Martin's Point Ltd., 12
Bankr. 721 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981).
59. "On equal footing." BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 632 (3d ed. 1969).
60. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (amended 1978).
61. 228 U.S. 482 (1913).
62. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
63. 147 F.2d 268 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 873 (1945).
64. Id. at 271.
65. Alco Prod. Inc. v. New York, N. Hay. & Hartf. R.R. (In re New York, N. Hay. & Hartf. R.R.), 405
F.2d 50, 51 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 999 (1968); In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 458 F. Supp. 1234, 1319-21
(E.D. Pa. 1978), affd, 596 F.2d 1154 (3d Cir. 1979).
66. 622 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1980).
1982]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
creditors holding claims of two hundred dollars or less were to be paid in full.
Other trade creditors holding claims greater than two hundred dollars were to
be paid forty percent of their claims. Unsecured creditors who were also
insiders of the debtor were to be paid nothing under the plan. 67
Despite the charge that the proposed classification scheme was arbitrary
and discriminatory, the court based confirmation on two grounds. First, no
equity in the debtor's property existed for distribution to unsecured creditors,
and, therefore, the insiders who took nothing under the plan would have taken
nothing in liquidation. The court also noted that the great majority of insiders
approved the plan.68
The second ground for confirmation spoke more to equitable considera-
tions. Since the trade creditors had advanced goods and services to the debtor
in the ordinary course of business without knowledge of the debtor's financial
condition, and since the trade creditors were to continue to supply the debtor
with goods and services, it was reasonable that they should be classified
separately and receive forty percent of their claims. In contrast, it was pre-
sumed that insiders loaning money to a debtor were in a position to know the
debtor's financial condition and the associated risks in loaning money. Also
important to the court's determination were the insiders' plans not to have
any ongoing relationship with the debtor after confirmation.69
The chapter X case of In re Four Seasons Nursing Centers of America,
Inc.70 is a similar example of equity in motion. This case concerned the clas-
sification of shareholders who had purchased their shares prior to the filing of
the petition, unlike those who purchased their shares after the petition was
filed. The former group, designated "Class G" creditor-stockholders, was
allowed to participate in the reorganization; the latter group, designated
"Class E," was deemed to have no economic claim against the debtor and,
therefore, was barred from participation. As a result of this classification
scheme, the Class E shareholders appealed the lower court's order approving
the plan. In affirming this order the court of appeals cited Collier on Bank-
ruptcy for its authority to discriminate between the two groups and stated:
"The reorganization court as a court of equity has broad powers in the matter
of classifying creditors and shareholders, and it necessarily has full power to
subordinate interests or classes of interests where the equities demand."'
Again, the facts provided an appropriate setting for the court to exercise
its equitable powers, since undoubtedly stockholders purchasing their equity
67. Id. at 875.
68. Id. at 879.
69. Id. Nonetheless, one must compare these standards of permissible discrimination to the stringent
standards for equitable subordination of the insiders' claims, e.g., Spach v. Bryant, 309 F.2d 886, 889 (5th Cir.
1962). While the equities in LeBlanc may have justified separate treatment akin to subordination, they may not
have justified actual subordination of the insiders' claims.
70. 472 F.2d 747 (10th Cir. 1973).
71. Id. at 749.
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interest after the petition was filed were on notice of the debtor's financial
difficulties.
Although the bankruptcy courts as courts of equity always have con-
sidered the equities of the situation and have subordinated claims when ap-
propriate,72 it was not until the current Code was enacted that a compre-
hensive provision on subordination emerged. Section 510(c)(1) provides that
"the court may-(1) under principles of equitable subordination, subordinate
for purposes of distribution all or part of an allowed claim to all or part of
another allowed claim or all or part of an allowed interest to all or part of
another allowed interest. ... .73
While this section of the statute relates specifically to equitable subor-
dination, the legislative history indicates that the court's power is broader
than the general doctrine of equitable subordination and encompasses subor-
dination on any equitable grounds. 74 Again, the legislative history acknowl-
edges that this section codifies prior case law. However, as Collier on
Bankruptcy points out, the Code fails to address the issue whether claims that
are equitably subordinated must be classified separately for purposes of the
plan. Collier on Bankruptcy opines that "such classification would not appear
to be necessary in all cases"75 and further points out the problems inherent in
separate classification. Specifically, if a subordinated creditor were classified
separately, consent from that class might not be forthcoming and the pro-
posed plan would have to comply with section 1129(b)(2)(B) to be confirmed
over the objection of the subordinated class. Therefore, the subordinated
claims may be classified with other claims and bound by the requisite majority
of the class. The court then may enforce the subordination for the benefit of
other claims in the class.
76
Aside from the equitable and statutory considerations leading to subordi-
nation, contractual subordination was recognized under the prior Act and now
is codified in section 510(a) of the Code, which states: "A subordination
agreement is enforceable in a case under this title to the same extent such
agreement is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law."
Again, a reading of prior case law reveals the source of this codification
and the importance of preserving consensual arrangements. St. Louis Union
Trust Co. v. Champion Shoe Machinery Co.78 is one example in which the
Eighth Circuit reversed a lower court ruling confirming a plan of reorganiza-
72. E.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
73. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
74. 124 CONG. REC. 11,095 (1978); 124 CONG. REC. 17,412 (1978).
75. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1122.031 (L. King 15th ed. 1982).
76. Id. Another common theme in the subordination arena, as it relates to a classification scheme, concerns
stock transfers claimed after the fact to be fraudulent. See Fleeger v. Ames, 120 F.2d 803 (10th Cir. 1941). Under
the Code this type of situation would be governed most likely by the statutory subordination section of 510(b).
See 11 U.S.C. § 510(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
77. 11 U.S.C. § 510(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
78. 109 F.2d 313 (8th Cir. 1940).
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tion that placed all bondholders in a single class. Specifically, the court de-
termined that when a corporation had issued bonds due in 1932, 1933, and
1934, and bonds due in 1932 had been paid and extension agreements were
made in 1933 and 1934, holders of the bonds due in 1933 who consented to the
first extension but not to the second were entitled to separate classification
and, by the terms of the trust indenture, were subordinated to those who
never consented to any extension. They were, however, superior to those
who consented to the last extension.79
While all the bonds were secured by the same pledged assets under the
same trust indenture, the court held that the rights of the respective parties
were sufficiently distinct to warrant separate classifications. It reasoned that
agreements between creditors to subordinate their indebtedness to that of
other creditors should be given effect in bankruptcy proceedings in terms of
separate classifications in order to preserve the sanctity of those agree-
ments.80
In similar fashion, the court in Bartle v. Markson Bros, Inc.,8 rejected
creditors' objections to a plan that provided full payment in cash and notes to
holders of debentures subordinated by contract to the claims of other unse-
cured creditors. The other unsecured creditors were to be paid forty-seven
percent of their claims in cash. Since the creditors had been advised of the
subordinate status of the debentures prior to their acceptance of the plan, and
since the amount to be received under the plan compared favorably with any
settlement in liquidation proceedings, the court supported the referee's find-
ing that the arrangement was in the best interests of the creditors. 2
While the underlying considerations for proposing payment to the sub-
ordinated creditors of fifteen percent in cash and eighty-five percent in notes,
as compared with the all-cash offer to the general unsecured creditors, are
unclear from the opinion, it may be that this classification and priority treat-
ment was designed to obtain class acceptance. The court condoned the ar-
rangement since the senior creditors were advised that the debentures were
subordinated before a majority of them accepted the plan, and it also ac-
knowledged that these senior creditors must have thought it wise to approve a
plan giving them almost half of their claims at once, even though the plan
promised eventual payment in full to the subordinated claims. The court itself
questioned their reasoning, but announced that the arrangement was not
necessarily erroneous in law. Accordingly, the lesson of Bartle, succinctly
stated by the court in In re McKenzie,84 is that "where each of two classes is
unsecured, but one is by contract subordinated to the other, they have dif-
79. Id. at 315-16.
80. Id.
81. 314 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1963).
82. Id. at 305.
83. Id. at 305-06. The case was, however, reversed and remanded on another issue. Id.
84. 4 Bankr. 88 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1980).
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ferent rights in whatever property of the estate is available for unsecured
claims." 5
In re Discon Corp. 6 is another example of separate classification of
unsecured creditors under a chapter XI plan in which a subordination agree-
ment was concerned. An indenture in that case contained a clause that pro-
vided for subordination in the event of reorganization or liquidation. How-
ever, the plan itself ignored the subordination agreement and proposed identi-
cal treatment of all unsecured creditors. Consequently, the appellate court set
aside the order that confirmed the plan of arrangement, holding that the plan
would not be in the best interests of all creditors because the unsecured
creditors could not be treated on a parity with one another without violating
the subordination provision.87
As these cases make clear, classification by subordination, as practiced
by the bankruptcy courts sitting as courts of equity, has taken its place in the
Code and deserves important consideration by a plan proponent when form-
ulating a classification scheme.
B. Voting Considerations
Perhaps the most important criterion influencing a proponent's classifica-
tion scheme is the potential voting power of the claimants. Courts reviewing
classification schemes should be acutely aware of this factor, since gerry-
mandering of claimants and classification for voting purposes may assure
plan acceptance. Courts in the past have not been blind to this problem, and
commentators have suggested that creditors whose voting interests are apart
from the rest should be classified separately, even though under the plan the
separate classes may be entitled to identical treatment.
88
This concept of separate classification based on voting considerations
was hinted at by the court in First National Bank v. Poland Union.89 In this
case two of the largest creditors, who were also shareholders, voted in the
creditor class to accept a plan of reorganization. Wearing their creditor hats in
the voting arena allowed them to profit considerably as shareholders through
a release of their disputed liability. The court recognized this problem: "In
such circumstances, it may be doubtful whether they should be permitted to
vote in the same class with other creditors not so intimately connected with
the enterprise."90 This concept has been explicitly adopted as part of the good
faith test of section 1126(e).
Poland Union was cited with seeming approval in American United
Mutual Life Insurance v. City ofAvon Park.91 This case turned on the manipu-
85. Id. at 90.
86. 346 F. Supp. 839 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
87. Id. at 845.
88. 6 COLLIER ONBANKRUPTCY 9.10, at 1605-06 (J. Moore 14th ed. 1978).
89. 109 F.2d 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 682 (1940).
90. Id. at 55.
91. 311 U.S. 138 (1940).
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lative potential of classification of claimants in a municipal composition under
chapter IX of the Chandler Act. The applicable statute provided:
[T]he judge shall classify the creditors according to the nature of their respective
claims and interests: Provided, however, That the holders of all claims, regardless
of the manner in which they are evidenced, which are payable without preference
out of funds derived from the same source or sources shall be of one class.
92
The Supreme Court recognized that voting in a single class may be in-
equitable and rejected the view that the sole criterion for classification was
prior economic status. 93 In so doing, it seemed to eschew the reasoning of J.
P. Morgan & Co. v. Missouri Pacific Railroad,94 in which the nature of the
claimant and its bias were rejected as appropriate considerations and inquiry
into the motives of those obtaining assents was prompted. Therefore, sepa-
rate classification was required if necessary to guarantee that the vote equi-
tably represented the judgment of the creditors.
At least one author has read City of Avon Park to permit further classi-
fication apart from the provisions of the statute and has suggested that it could
apply to other chapters as well.95
As these cases point out, creditors within one class may have substan-
tially similar claims but dissimilar interests in the fate of the debtor. The more
difficult problem the courts may face under the Code is the classification of
dissimilar claims in the same class for the purpose of drowning out a particular
voice in order to guarantee acceptance of the plan.
C. Separate Classifications Due to Different Treatment Under the Plan
A result-oriented criterion frequently used in Act cases to justify separate
classification of claims was the different treatment to be afforded the various
claimants. Section 1 123(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code speaks to this aspect of
classification: "(a) A plan shall ... (4) provide the same treatment for each
claim or interest of a particular class, unless the holder of a particular claim or
interest agrees to a less favorable treatment of such particular claim or in-
terest."96
Since the "substantially similar" language of chapter 11 has been inter-
preted not to require that all substantially similar claims be placed in the same
class, but only that those claims grouped together in a class be substantially
similar to one another,97 different treatment may be an appropriate reason to
classify claimants separately. A number of Act cases suggest that this dif-
ferent treatment is a justifiable criterion for the division of creditors.
92. Act of Aug. 16, 1937, ch. 657, 50 Stat. 653, 656 (amended 1938) (emphasis in original).
93. 311 U.S. 138, 143-44 (1940).
94. 85 F.2d 351 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 604 (1936). See supra text accompanying notes 21-26.
95. Note, Equity Power of Bankruptcy Courts Over Classification and Assignment of Claims, 50 YALE
L.J. 892 (1940).
96. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4) (Supp. IV 1980).
97. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 1122.03[1] (L. King 15th ed. 1982).
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One of the classic statements on this issue was offered by the court in
Kyser v. MacAdam.98 This chapter XII proceeding concerned a priority dis-
pute between a mortgagee and the holder of a mechanic's lien on the same prop-
erty. Before reversing and remanding the case the court determined that the
mortgage and materialmen's liens were not on a parity with one another and
should not be classified together. Taking a result-oriented approach, the court
held that "a different treatment in the plan of claims of even the same ec-
onomic status requires separate classification.- 99
In another case concerning secured creditors, the court in Mokava Corp.
v. Dolan'iJ refused to allow two first mortgages to be lumped together in the
same class. The debtor in Dolan was a hotel corporation, the creditors of
which held mortgages against the hotel. Of the two mortgages grouped to-
gether, one secured the so-called main building, and the other the annex.
While the court recognized that the holder of the first mortgage on the annex
had purchased the mortgage with an intent to thwart acceptance of the plan,
the central issue revolved around the single classification that included two
first mortgages slated to receive substantially different treatment in the pro-
posed plan. Not only was the initial classification incorrect because the mort-
gages were secured separately on two different buildings, but as the court
pointed out, "the error here was aggravated when the court approved a plan
according very substantially different treatment to the two mortgages" that
were lumped together in the same class.'0 ' This conflicts with the Palisades-
on-the-Desplaines'02 holding on the separate classification of first mortgages.
The conflict is based more upon the discriminatory treatment within the single
class of creditors than on the classification itself. Had the plan provided equal
treatment to both creditors, the court might have accepted joining both cred-
itors in a single class.
The Ninth Circuit took a similar result-oriented approach in West Coast
Life Insurance v. Merced Irrigation District'03 in the context of a chapter IX
composition. There, disputed classification arose from a single class contain-
ing both matured and unmatured bond obligations. Contrary to Kyser and
Mokava, the court determined that one class was appropriate when all were to
be paid from the same source, citing Remington's treatise for the proposition
that "the fundamental classification must be in accordance with the source or
fund out of which the payment is intended to be made." °4 The court only paid
lip service to the idea of separate classification when it said, "Of course every
bond of different maturing date and every interest coupon is in a sense in a
98. 117 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1941).
99. Id. at 237.
100. 147 F.2d 340 (2d Cir. 1945).
101. Id. at 344.
102. 89 F.2d 214 (7th Cir. 1937). See supra text accompanying notes 34-43.
103. 114 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1940).
104. H. REMINGTON, A TREATISE ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 4361 (1939).
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class by itself, but no one would contend that this difference is within the
meaning of the bankruptcy law a mark for classification."' 05
The Ninth Circuit underscored its support of the separation of claims for
separate treatment three years later in Western Mesa Oil Corp. v. Edlou Co.'
°6
The court confirmed an arrangement that gave one class of unsecured claims
priority over another when the favored class was owed past-due royalties on a
lease. To secure the consent of these unsecured claimants the debtor provided
that this class be paid in full in the same manner as true priority claims.
Among other arguments, the appellants claimed that this division of unse-
cured creditors was invalid because it gave one class of unsecured claims
priority over another. Citing section 357 under chapter XI for authority to
divide claims into separate classes and to treat them in different ways, the
court affirmed the judgment of the district court.'07
In similar fashion, In re Boston Metropolitan Buildings, Inc.'03 stands for
the proposition that separate treatment of creditors justifies separate classifi-
cation under a chapter X plan. Since the creditor in question, New England
Theatres, Inc., was receiving different, less favorable treatment than other
security holders, separate classification was warranted.' 9
One of the most recent cases containing classification of claims on the
basis of different treatment is In re Jaco Fabrics, Inc. " This case concerned a
chapter XI plan of arrangement that divided the nonpriority unsecured debts
into two classes, one of which contained debts of three hundred dollars or
less. The remainder of the unsecured creditors were placed in "Class 4." The
plan provided that certain Class 4 claims were not to be affected by the plan,
but were to be paid outside the arrangement, and it was silent on the other
Class 4 claims. The effect of this provision was that the remaining creditors
would receive 22 cents on the dollar, while the others were to be paid
outside the plan."'
Citing section 357 of chapter XI, the court recognized that unsecured
claims could be divided into classes and accorded different treatment. How-
ever, this difference in treatment must be "just and reasonably necessary to
effectuate the arrangement."' 1 2 By classifying the creditors in Article I of the
plan and then excluding from Article I classes those creditors in Article III,
any reasonable classification of creditors was destroyed, and the court denied
confirmation on this basis." 3 This tactic of segregating creditors and attempt-
ing to pay off some outside the plan is a prevalent theme in chapter 13 cases
and will be discussed in more detail later."
4
105. 114 F.2d 654, 672 (9th Cir. 1940).
106. 143 F.2d 843 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 786 (1944).
107. Id. at 845-46.
108. 92 F. Supp. 843 (D. Mass. 1950).
109. Id. at 848.
110. 3 BANKR. Cr. DEC. (CRR) 1301 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Jan. 5, 1978).
111. Id. at 1301-02.
112. Id. at 1302.
113. Id.
114. See infra text accompanying notes 133-38.
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Perhaps the most intriguing question about separate classification arising
from different plan treatment is whether treatment of such groups is meant to
be comparable or equal though different, and if so, whether it actually is
discriminatory. This determination will depend on a number of factors. As
one example, the court in In re Celotex Co.115 allowed holders of debentures,
as investors, to be given notes of longer maturity than the notes given mer-
chandise creditors.1
6
IV. THOSE "FEW IMMUTABLE PRINCIPLES"
Having surveyed a representative sample of case law under the Act to
divine the appropriate criteria for classification of claims, what general prin-
ciples have emerged?
The first principle apparent from the construction of the statute and past
case law is the threshold for classification: the fundamental division between
equity interest holders and creditors. Beyond this, secured and unsecured
claims are to be classified separately. Unsecured creditors may be divided
into classes when the legal character or effect of their claims accords rights
and priorities against the debtor's property in a liquidation setting different
from those of other unsecured creditors. Shareholders may be divided further
into preferred and common, depending on the nature of interests presented,
and it is possible that these categories may be divided further. To determine
these further classifications, one may rely on the general rule that "[c]reditors
of a kind and of equal rank, with claims against the same property, should be
placed in the same class, while creditors of a kind but of different ranks, and
creditors of the same kind and rank but with claims against different proper-
ties, should be separately classified.""1
7
Other determinants of classification in the past have revolved around
contractual subordination, equitable considerations, voting concerns, and dif-
ferent treatment accorded claimants in the plan. These general determinants
become less immutable when one considers the warning that these "general-
izations must be applied in light of specific facts, and rules must be construed
in the light of the respective circumstances .... 118
The real question becomes how these few "immutable principles" will
fare in light of recent changes in the bankruptcy law, or more specifically,
what changes effected by the enactment of the Code will have a bearing on the
classification of claims and interests.
V. CHANGES IN THE CODE AFFECTING CLASSIFICATION
Since the Bankruptcy Code became effective on October 1, 1979, few
reported chapter 11 cases have reached the classification issue. Accordingly,
one can only speculate about the long term effects of the changes made by the
115. 12 F. Supp. I (D. Del. 1935).
116. Id. at 5.
117. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 9.10, at 1601 (J. Moore 14th ed. 1978).
118. Id. at 1595.
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new Code. However, a cursory look at a few of the changes may prove helpful
in predicting the course of the future.
One obvious difference between the Act and the Code is the withdrawal
of the judge's power to classify claims. Under the Code the debtor is afforded
that right during the exclusivity period," 9 although creditor input is important.
The judge no longer may classify claims, and the only recourse available to
the judge is to withhold confirmation under section 1129(a)(1) when the plan
does not comply with the applicable provisions of the chapter, namely, sec-
tion 1122 on classification. By the same token, a creditor who is outvoted in
his class also may oppose plan confirmation under section 1129(a)(1).
Because the "fair and equitable" determination by the court becomes
operative only in the event of a cramdown, 2 it is foreseeable that class
manipulation may be attempted simply to outvote disgruntled creditors. 2 '
An examination of classification problems emerging under chapter 13 of
the Code may shed additional light on changes between the Act and the Code
and illuminate the path to be followed in chapter 11 reorganizations.
VI. CLASSIFICATION OF CLAIMS UNDER CHAPTER 13 OF THE CODE
To understand the classification criteria set out in section 1122, it may
prove useful to look at the chapter 13 cases decided under the Code that
directly address this issue. Since chapter 13 explicitly incorporates the stan-
dards set forth in chapter 1 l,22 these recent chapter 13 cases may be indica-
tive of what one can expect in a chapter 11 classification problem.
While a strong sentiment exists among scholars and professionals work-
ing in the field that chapter 13 plans should not influence classification
schemes in chapter 11 cases because the two chapters are different species,
23
the fact remains that chapter 13 standards are derived from chapter 11. Even
more to the point, the same judges now wrestling with classification issues in
chapter 13 cases will be called upon to resolve the disputes as they arise in
chapter 11 cases, and they cannot be expected to interpret the same words of
the same statute differently because a different chapter of the Code is con-
cerned.
The chapter 13 provisions relevant to classification of unsecured claims
state:
(a) The Plan shall-
119. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
120. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (Supp. IV 1980). A cramdown is the confirmation by a court of a classification
plan over the dissent of a class of claims or ownership interests. Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About
Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133, 134 (1979).
121. For an unsuccessful attempt to cram down a plan over the objections of disgruntled creditors, see In re
Landau Boat Co., 8 Bankr. 432 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981).
122. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
123. Epstein, Chapter 13: Its Operation, Its Statutory Requirements as to Payment to and Classification of
Unsecured Claims, and Its Advantages, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 17 (1980).
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(3) if the plan classifies claims, provide the same treatment for each claim
within a particular class.
(b) Subject to subsections (a) and (c) of this section the plan may-
(1) designate a class or classes of unsecured claims, as provided in section
1122 of this title, but may not discriminate unfairly against any class so
designated; .... 124
The statute sets up three criteria by which claims may be classified. The
first criterion states that the treatment provided for each claim within a class
must be the same. It encompasses part of section 1123(a)(4) of chapter 11 and
establishes that different treatment of claims within the same class would
have the effect of creating separate classes.
The second criterion to be considered in the classification of claims di-
rectly injects the standards of chapter 11 by requiring that a claim or interest
in a particular class be "substantially similar" to other claims or interests of
the class. As noted earlier, this does not mean that all substantially similar
claims must be placed in the same class. It only means that the claims within
any particular class must be substantially similar to one another.
The third criterion, which provides that there may be no unfair discrimi-
nation against a designated class, is the criterion upon which the courts focus
most often when a classification problem arises. Although no parallel re-
quirement exists in section 1122, this criterion becomes a consideration in
chapter 11 when the plan is not accepted by all classes and the plan proponent
has requested the court to cram down the plan over creditors' objections
under section 1129(b)(1).
In analyzing section 1322 and case law decided under that section, it
should be noted that chapter XIII of the Act did not permit separate classifi-
cation of unsecured claims with different treatment accorded the separate
classes. Therefore, the courts have had to interpret the new chapter 13 sec-
tions to determine whether and to what extent a classification scheme may be
approved. As under chapter 11, this process concerns consideration of case
law under the Act as codified in section 1122 of the Code. Since "few im-
mutable principles" can be extracted consistently from the cases, the courts
have found classification problematic. As a result, interpretations have been
as varied as their representative fact patterns, and there is still little agreement
concerning general rules. Despite the inconsistencies, a review of classifica-
tion cases under chapter 13 will demonstrate the flexibility of the law and its
possible future directions under chapter 11.
The chapter 13 cases to date fall into two basic sets. The common bond
that exists in the first set of cases is court confirmation of a plan in which
claims were classified separately either within the plan or through payment
outside the plan. The second set of cases reaches the opposite result, denying
confirmation because of "unfairly discriminatory" claims classification. The
124. 11 U.S.C. § 1322 (Supp. IV 1980).
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differences between the two sets of cases illustrate the tension between the
principles of equality on the one hand and the politics of the reorganization
process on the other hand.
Within the broad category of the first set of cases, recurring themes are
evident: comparison of payments under the plan to payments on liquidation;
allowances for payments of nondischargeable debts; and allowances for pay-
ments of cosigned debts. Perhaps the most liberal approach to the classifica-
tion issue was that taken by the court in In re Sutherland.' This court held
that the debtor could place unsecured medical debts, bank notes, and credit
accounts needed for continuation of the debtor's business in separate classes
and make payments to those classes to assure continued medical treatment
and continued credit for the debtor's business. The remainder of the unse-
cured creditors were placed in a separate class that would not be paid. 2 6
The court discussed the rational basis classification criteria set up by
several other courts and held that the debtor's classification of claims and
proposed payments was rational since the payments to the favored class
assured the continuance of the debtor's business and his continued health
necessary to operate his business. Addressing the unfair discrimination issue,
the court summarily concluded that "there [cannot] be an unfairly discrimina-
tory classification against any class of unsecured creditors when unsecured
creditors would not receive anything in the event of liquidation in a Chapter
7.',127
The court further reasoned that it made "no sense to have a system that
prevents them from paying one or more unsecured creditors of their choos-
ing" under "circumstances where the debtors do not have to pay anything to
any unsecured creditors." 28 It went overboard in its reasoning by announcing
that "this court would allow a classification for unsecured creditors whose
credit managers have redheaded secretaries."' 2 9
As the court pointed out in Sutherland, one fairness standard to which
some courts adhere is a comparison of what the discriminated class would
receive under a straight bankruptcy. Under this standard, if the disfavored
class may be receiving some percentage under the proposed plan and would
receive nothing under chapter 7, separate classification and different treat-
ment may not be unfair. If the debtor is not permitted to discriminate, the
debtor may be forced to file under chapter 7 and those creditors would still
receive nothing. The courts also consider that the debtor could have filed
under chapter 7 but chose not to."3° Thus, such classifications are not ipso
facto unfair discrimination.
125. 3 Bankr. 420 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1980).
126. Id. at 421.
127. Id. at 422.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See In re Haag, 3 Bankr. 649 (Bankr. D. Or. 1980).
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This standard is also evident in In re Curtis,3' in which the court bandied
about the rational basis language in its approach to a classification question. It
held that a one hundred percent payment on a child-support arrearage and a
ten percent dividend to other unsecured creditors was fair because the child
support was not a dischargeable debt under section 523(a)(3)(A)(5) and the
plan offered the ten percent group of unsecured creditors as much as or more
than they would receive on liquidation. 32
Similarly, the court in In re Haag,33 faced with the same objection to a
payment of one hundred percent on a child-support arrearage, held that the
plan did not discriminate unfairly since the disfavored class was receiving a
twenty-five percent payment. In a chapter 7 these unsecured creditors would
receive nothing, and the claim for past child support would be nondischarge-
able. Therefore, the debtor, by filing a chapter 7, could obtain the same relief as
in a chapter 13, without obligating any future income toward payment of the
claims of general unsecured creditors. Given this reasoning, the court felt it
was not unfair to allow the classification and proposed different treatment. 134
The court in Haag also brought up another important point: whether
paying a claim outside a plan itself constitutes a classification. Even this point
is contested. The court in In re Blevins 35 found that the debtor's election to
pay some claims within and some outside the plan constituted a classification,
whereas the court in In re Berry3 6 thought it questionable "whether any
payments 'outside the plan' constitut[ed] a designation 'of a class of unse-
cured claims, as provided in § 1122 ... '. " While a dispute over this point
does exist, if the outside payment is deemed to create a classification the court
must determine whether the classification unfairly discriminates. 38 Adher-
ence to the principle of equality of treatment for creditors suggests that out-
side payments should be examined as a sub rosa form of classification.
A similar question arose in In re Wittenmeier,139 in which the court reaf-
firmed one of the few general rules of classification: each secured creditor
is normally in a separate class. The court allowed the debtor to pay a secured
lender outside the plan. 40
Also in this same line of cases are In re Hill4' and In re Garcia 42 Both
dealt with the separate classification of a cosigned debt for the purpose of
paying that particular creditor more than other unsecured creditors. In Garcia
131. 2 Bankr. 43 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1979).
132. Id. at 44-45.
133. 3 Bankr. 649 (Bankr. D. Or. 1980).
134. Id. at 651.
135. 1 Bankr. 442 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1979).
136. 5 Bankr. 515 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980).
137. Id. at 517.
138. ii U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
139. 4 Bankr. 86 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980).
140. Id. at 87.
141. 4 Bankr. 694 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980).
142. 6 Bankr. 35 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980).
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the debtor also separated a debt owed to his attorney on an ongoing nonbank-
ruptcy matter for the purpose of paying that claim in full. All other unsecured
creditors in Garcia were slated to receive nothing, as they would have in a
chapter 7 liquidation. The court cited Sutherland in confirming the plan. 43 In
Hill the debtor created three separate classes of unsecured claims. Aside from
the segregation of the cosigned debt into a separate class, the plan classified
separately doctors with whom the debtor expected to have future dealings and
provided a larger payment to that class. The court confirmed that plan also.
44
Separate classification of a cosigned debt is another common theme in
chapter 13 cases, and it is easy to see why. As Judge Lee points out in his
article Chapter 13 nee Chapter XIII:
The reason for wanting to place debts on which codebtors are obligated in a
separate class is the fact that the automatic stay against collection from codebtors
on consumer debts is operative only to the extent the debt is to be paid under the
plan. A creditor may obtain relief from the stay and proceed against the codebtor
to the extent the debt is not dealt with by the plan.'
45
If debtors are allowed to classify separately debts on which another
person has cosigned to prevent the creditor from proceeding separately
against the cosigner (usually a relative), as Judge Lee points out, smart cred-
itors will "retaliate by requiring the signature of codebtors on all debts."' 46
Despite these ramifications of the separate classification of cosigned ob-
ligations, the court in In re Kovich 47 reaffirmed this type of separate clas-
sification after developing and applying guidelines for determining whether a
particular classification scheme was unfairly discriminatory under section
1322(b)(1). The issue before the court in Kovich was the propriety of a separate
classification of obligations concerning a codebtor and a landlord, slated to
receive full payment, when other unsecured creditors were to receive only ten
percent in satisfaction of their claims. The court reviewed existing case law,
decided that the proposed classification was not fatally defective, and reset
the case for confirmation hearings. 48 In one of the better discussions of the
criteria to be considered in determining whether a classification unfairly dis-
criminates against unsecured creditors, the court opined:
Each case must be decided on its own merits. Is there a reasonable basis for
the classification? Is the debtor able to perform a plan without the classification?
Has the debtor acted in good faith in the proposed classification? Certainly the
debtor should not be permitted to pay a creditor less because of ill will. Another
consideration must be the treatment of the class discriminated against. Are they
receiving a meaningful payment or is the plan just a sham? 49
143. Id. at 38.
144. 4 Bankr. 694, 700 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980).
145. Lee, Chapter 13 nee Chapter XIII, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 303, 313 (1979).
146. Id.
147. 4 Bankr. 403 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1980).
148. Id. at 406-07.
149. Id. at 407.
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One of the more recent cases allowing separate classifications for unse-
cured debts was In re Perskin.'50 Addressing the outside-the-plan question of
classification, the court determined that although section 1322(b)(1) did not
literally address discrimination when one claim is being paid outside the plan,
the section logically is suited to govern cases in which payments to creditors
outside the plan discriminate unfairly. The plan in this case provided for the
debtor's retention of two credit cards with payments on the outstanding and
future obligations to be handled outside the plan. An objection was filed by a
bank, claiming that this arrangement was unfair discrimination against other
creditors who were being compensated within the plan.'
5
'
The court admitted that the plan discriminated between the classes, but
held that since the debtor was a travelling salesman it was necessary for him
to retain the credit cards to pay his expenses and stay in business. Thus, the
debtor treated the two classes differently so the plan would work, and the
court found that while discrimination existed, it was reasonable under the
circumstances. 152
Despite the number of cases that allow separate classification of unse-
cured claims, this first set of cases represents the minority view. Since the
Code was enacted, the emerging majority of cases insists upon more equal
treatment of creditors. While all these cases are derived from the principle of
equality of treatment for creditors, a close reading reveals the same inconsis-
tencies as in the cases condoning classification resulting in unequal treatment.
A review of a representative sample of these recent decisions demonstrates
the inconsistencies of standards and approaches.
One of the most often cited opinions is In re Iacovoni 53 As in the cases
mentioned earlier, the debtor attempted to classify separately an unsecured
debt that had been cosigned and to pay this creditor one hundred percent,
while paying the remainder of the unsecured creditors nothing. 54
Citing section 1122 and noting the Collier on Bankruptcy interpretation,
the court stated that the authorities implicitly required that all nonpriority
claims have an equal right to distribution of assets after payment of secured
and priority claims. In the court's words, "[T]his would comport with classifi-
cation based on the legal nature of a claim, all unsecured creditors having
similar right, absent some reason for equitable subordination, to the assets of
the estate."' 55 The court determined that the only exception to requiring all
unsecured claims to be classified in a single class, other than equitable sub-
ordination, was the administrative convenience exception codified in section
1122(b).156
150. 9 Bankr. 626 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981).
151. Id. at 628.
152. Id. at 632.
153. 2 Bankr. 256 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980).
154. Id. at 258.
155. Id. at 260.
156. Id. The administrative convenience exception is derived from prior practice under chapters X, XI, and
XII, permitting full or greater payment of de minimis claims.
19821
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
In light of this interpretation, the court held that section 1122 did not
allow a separate classification of an unsecured debt based solely on the pres-
ence of a codebtor. This was an arbitrary classification that the court felt
discriminated unfairly. The court recognized and discussed the opposing
point of view, and stated it most succinctly:
Nevertheless, it may be argued with some practical force, that previous case
law and present Chapter 11 restrictions ought not apply to Chapter 13 classifica-
tions. Unsecured creditors have no vote on the Chapter 13 plan and, therefore,
"improper" classification does not compromise voting power as it may in Chapter
11. Furthermore, since there is arguably little obvious incentive or requirement
that Chapter 13 debtors pay anything to unsecured creditors (assuming those
creditors would receive nothing in Chapter 7 liquidation), any classification of
unsecured creditors may result in at least payment to some creditors who other-
wise might receive nothing. Finally, the objective of broad debtor's relief is com-
promised if separate classification of co-obligor debts is not allowed)
57
The court found this argument unpersuasive:
Chapter 13 classification is tied directly to Chapter I 1 classification restrictions by
11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(b) (1) and 1122 as noted earlier. This direct tie reflects a legisla-
tive intent to adopt existing classification restrictions and to provide some protec-
tion to the unsecured Chapter 13 creditor precisely because the creditor has no
vote. This protection is particularly critical to the significant creditor of the
Chapter 13 business debtor whose subordination to personal or business codebtor
debts might effect a substantial injustice and, indeed, a future proclivity by lenders
to demand a cosigner. The broad relief of Chapter 13 has its limits. Therefore, the
Court now holds that an unsecured debt classified separately and treated differ-
ently solely on the basis of the existence of a codebtor is an improper classification
under 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (1).'"8
Confirmation also was denied in a number of other cases based on the
separate classification of a codebtor. The court in In re Fonnest,59 held that no
reason existed to differentiate a codebtor note. The court in In re Montano'60
held that a separate classification of unsecured debts solely on the basis of the
existence of cosigners was an improper classification. In In re Utter 6' a debt
cosigned by a relative was placed in a separate class with the expectation of
receiving one hundred percent of the claim, while the other unsecured cred-
itors had expectations of little or nothing. In concurring with Iacovoni and
holding that the disparity of treatment between the classes was unfairly dis-
criminatory, the court held: "The existence of a co-debtor does not change
the nature of the debt itself nor does it alter that debt's position in respect to
its claim on the debtor's assets."'' 62
157. 2 Bankr. 256, 261 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980).
158. Id.
159. 1 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d (MB) 383 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 1980).
160. 4 Bankr. 535 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1980).
161. 3 Bankr. 369 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1980).
162. Id. at 369.
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The court in In re Wade'63 also followed the lead of Iacovoni in refusing
to confirm a plan in which an unsecured debt that had been cosigned was
relegated to a class of its own and favored over other unsecured debts. The
court determined that the only difference between the debts was the different
treatment accorded the creditors.' 64
In re Crago65 is another example of a failure of plan confirmation as a
direct result of separate classification of a debt that had a cosigner. The court
recognized the problems inherent in bankruptcy when a cosigned debt is
involved and indicated that there may be "other methods by which the co-
signed debt can be handled within the ambit of a Chapter 13 proceeding which
will protect both the debtor and the individual who has co-signed for the
debtor without unfairly classifying these claims."' 66 Unfortunately, the court
offered no suggestions.
These issues were analyzed again at length in In re McKenzie.' 67 Once
again, the court refused confirmation of a plan that separately classified a debt
with a cosigner and provided full payment to that class. In refusing to confirm
the plan, the court discussed the prior case law codified in section 1122 and
concluded that any classification of unsecured creditors would discriminate.
However, the court did not condemn discrimination per se, but asked whether
the discrimination was unfair under section 1322(b)(1). It then determined
that all unsecured creditors have the same rights vis-h.-vis property of the
estate and that the existence of a third-party guarantor on an obligation does
nothing to change the nature of the claim against the estate. Accordingly, it
held that allowing the claim more than a pro rata share in the estate would
discriminate unfairly against the remaining unsecured creditors. 68
The court also recognized that its holding would create practical prob-
lems while upholding the principle of equality of treatment of creditors:
As to the argument that the Court's interpretation of the power to classify will
foster extra-judicial arrangements by Chapter 13 debtors to protect their standing
amongst friends, relatives and co-workers, the Court can only point out that that is
a problem to be addressed by the debtor in fashioning his plan, or by Congress if it
sees fit.
169
As the court correctly observed, the debtor's inability to classify claims
within the proposed plan according to whether there is a codebtor on that debt
may result in the debtor's paying that creditor outside the plan. As noted
earlier, however, many courts recognize this tactic to be the same as classi-
fying claims and require that it pass muster as a classification scheme under
163. 4 Bankr. 98 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980).
164. Id. at 100.
165. 4 Bankr. 483 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980).
166. Id. at 484.
167. 4 Bankr. 88 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1980).
168. Id. at 91.
169. Id. at 91-92.
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section 1322(b)(1). And while the courts in Hill'70 and Garcia7' allowed the
payment -of cosigned and other debts outside the plan, in general the courts
frown on this type of special treatment. If nothing else, they subject the
debtor's classification scheme to the unfair discrimination test.
The court's opinion in In re Blevins72 sheds light on the practice of
excluding certain creditors from a plan by discussing the prior chapter XIII.
According to the court, under chapter XIII claims secured by estates in real
property or chattels real were not claims within the ambit of chapter XIII and,
therefore, could not be included in the proceeding. Thus, the practice de-
veloped that certain secured creditors were treated outside the plan. The facts
in Blevins, however, concerned a partially secured creditor to be paid outside
the chapter 13 plan. The court found no legislative approval of this practice
and was forced to conclude "that all claims should, and perhaps must, be
treated within the terms of the proposed plan, unless substantial justification
is provided for exclusion of a claim from the plan provisions." 73
Thus, instead of determining that payment of a claim outside a plan
consituted a classification that then required a determination whether one
class was being discriminated against unfairly, the court reached the same
result by falling back on section 1322(a)(3), which requires equal treatment for
each claim in a particular class. The court, therefore, found that certain cred-
itors outside the plan, who were supposed to be in the same class with claims
of a similar nature inside the plan, actually were receiving better treatment.
The court then refused confirmation because of unfair discrimination. In care-
fully analyzing the proposed payments to the classes under the plan, the court
recognized its important role and expressed the following caveat to other
courts looking at classification problems under chapter 13:
A creditor, or class of creditors, dissatisfied with the classification of claims in a
Chapter I 1 proceeding may opt to vote to reject the provisions of the plan. This
option is not available, however, in Chapter 13. The inability of a Chapter 13
claimant holding an unsecured claim to vote to accept or reject a Chapter 13 plan
places a greater burden on the Court to scrutinize the classification of claims as
chosen by the debtor and confirm only those plans where the classification chosen
does not discriminate unfairly against any creditor. 74
This is the better approach to the outside-the-plan problem, because the
principle of equality of treatment demands consideration of all payments to
creditors, whether inside or outside a formal plan, to determine whether the
plan is unfairly discriminatory.
In a companion decision to Blevins, Judge Sidman in In re Tatum 75
refused to confirm a plan that proposed payment to three partially secured
170. In re Hill, 4 Bankr. 694 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980).
171. In re Garcia, 6 Bankr. 35 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980).
172. 1 Bankr. 442 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1979).
173. Id. at 444.
174. Id.
175. 1 Bankr. 445 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1979).
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creditors outside the plan. Since there was no rational explanation why some
claims should be paid outside the chapter 13 plan, the judge could see no
reason why similarly situated creditors should not be given equal treatment. 176
The judge even expressed surprise concerning the proposed outside-the-plan
payments on the basis of section 1328, which warns that debts not provided
for by the plan are not discharged. 77
Classification of claims within a plan can fail the unfairly discriminatory
test of section 1322(b)(1), as shown by the codebtor cases previously cited and
by those that follow. In re Fizer 178 was another decision by Judge Sidman in
which he refused to allow a partially secured creditor to receive payment on
the unsecured and secured portions of his claim because other unsecured
creditors did not fare so well. 79
In In re Gay180 the plan established two classes of unsecured claims, one
group to whom the debtor had issued bad checks and the other that included
all other unsecured claims. The court deemed the debtor's plan to pay the first
group one hundred percent of their claims and the second group two percent
of theirs unfairly discriminatory under section 1322(b)(1) despite the possible
threat of criminal proceedings by the creditors holding the bad checks.'8 '
The court in Gay took issue with the Iacovoni court's delineation of only
two exceptions to uniform classification of unsecured claims. Although the
Gay court refused to allow the separate classification scheme proposed by the
debtor, it took the more liberal position that separate classification of unse-
cured creditors is permissible and different treatment accorded to the classes
is allowed unless unfair discrimination exists, suggesting that "the de-
termination of what constitutes unfair discrimination requires a view of the
nature of the claims in each proposed class and the treatment to be accorded
them." 18 2 Besides these statutory criteria, the court injected its own equitable
criteria:
Other factors must be taken into account, such as the creditor's rights, if any,
against third parties and the importance of the classification to the debtor's "fresh
start," and to his ability to perform under the plan. The propriety of each proposed
classification should be considered with reference to the facts of the case. Sound
judicial discretion should be exercised in determining whether, from both the
creditor's and debtor's point of view, a proposed classification is unfairly discrim-
inatory.8 3
In another 1980 decision, In re Blackwell,' 4 the court sidestepped a find-
ing on the question of unfair discrimination by holding that the proposed plan
176. Id. at 446.
177. See also In re Weeden, 7 Bankr. 106 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1980).
178. 1 Bankr. 400 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1979).
179. See also In re Cooper, 3 Bankr. 246 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980).
180. 3 Bankr. 336 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980).
181. Id. at 338.
182. Id. at 337.
183. Id. at 338.
184. 5 Bankr. 748 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1980).
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did not meet the good faith standard of section 1325(a)(3). The plan in this
case proposed a five percent distribution to unsecured creditors except for the
debtor's landlord, who was to receive one hundred percent of his unpaid rent.
In denying confirmation of the plan, the court conceded that "a plan which
does not give unsecured creditors a 'good faith' amount cannot be called
'fair.'' '
85
Continuing in this same vein is a recent Texas decision, In re Dziedzic.
116
Confirmation was denied at the trustee's request because of the separate
classification and treatment of the unsecured claim of the debtor's credit
union. This creditor was slated to receive one hundred percent, while the
remaining unsecured creditors were to be paid twenty-six percent of their
claims. The debtor claimed that the credit union should be treated differently
because his failure to pay this debt completely would harm his job standing as
a police officer, subject him to social embarrassment, and put him in jeopardy
of physical abuse. After discussing other case law in this area the court denied
confirmation because "the degree of discrimination is high; the justification
for it insufficient."'' 87
Despite the disparate holding on this particular issue, a close reading of
the cases reveals evolving standards for determining whether a classification
scheme discriminates unfairly. These standards are as follows:
(1) Whether the discrimination has a reasonable or rational basis;
(2) whether the debtor can carry out a plan without discrimination;
(3) whether the discrimination is proposed in good faith;
(4) whether the difference in treatment is severe or inconsequential; and
(5) whether the class being discriminated against is receiving a meaningful
payment.
Despite the lack of guidance provided by the statute, the courts have
enunciated these standards in the realization that no hard-and-fast rules can
exist when each classification scheme must turn on the particular facts of the
case. This approach taken by the courts was most accurately described by
Professor Epstein when he noted that classification of claims under chapter 13
"presents problems of interpreting cryptic statutory language and balancing
competing policy considerations.' 88 The competing policy considerations
here, as elsewhere in reorganization law, are the principle of equality of
treatment on the one hand, and on the other hand, the pressures to differenti-
ate between creditors for economic or other practical reasons.
Competition between these policies may be more pronounced in chapter
13 cases because the individual chapter 13 debtor is a more sympathetic figure
than a corporate chapter 11 debtor engaged in major business activities and
185. Id. at 751. Decisions on plan confirmation on the basis ofgood faith alone are abundant, but need not
be dealt with here.
186. 9 Bankr. 424 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1981).
187. Id. at 427.
188. Epstein, Chapter 13: Its Operation, Its Statutory Requirements as to Payment to and Classification of
Unsecured Claims, and Its Advantages, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 17 (1980).
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because of the smaller dollar amounts at stake in chapter 13 cases.' 89 In
addition, creditors in chapter 11 cases must vote on the plan;' 90 creditors in
chapter 13 cases do not. A chapter 11 court may view classification issues
more carefully because improper classification may circumvent the voting
requirements of chapter 11.
Therefore, chapter 13 cases may raise as many questions as they answer
even though they afford a preview of future developments under chapter 11.
For this reason, the Collier on Bankruptcy statement about classification
under the Act is still true: "classification ... is one as to which few im-
mutable principles can be pronounced.' 9'
VII. THE PRINCIPLES EMERGE
Nonetheless, some principles do emerge from the synthesis of case law
under the Chandler Act and the Bankruptcy Code. If viewed as guides rather
than rules, they can assist the debtor or creditor steering through the classifi-
cation process.
Principle 1: The nature of the claim or interest is based upon the relationship of
the claim to the debtor, rather than on the nature or identity of the claim or
interest holder.
This is perhaps the most immutable principle, having survived without
change through three successive bankruptcy laws. It provides the basis for
the initial division of claims from interests; the subdivision of claims into
secured, priority, general unsecured, and subordinated unsecured claims; and
the subdivision of interests into preferred stock, common stock, warrants,
options, and so forth.
The corollary to this principle, as recently enunciated in Martin's Point
Ltd., is that since the classification process revolves around the claim and not
the claimant, a claimant may be a member of several classes as a result of
being both a creditor and an equity interest holder. Just because a creditor
also holds a more subordinate interest in the same debtor is not a reason to
subordinate his claim to that of a creditor who is not also an equity security
holder, or to treat it differently from other substantially similar claims.' 92
Principle 2: Claims of a similar nature need not be classified in the same class.
Notwithstanding judicial reluctance to encourage a multiplicity of
classes,' 93 neither the Code nor case law requires that all claims of a similar
nature be classified in the same class. Small claims may be classified sepa-
189. Under II U.S.C. [ 109(e) (Supp. IV 1980), a chapter 13 debtor must have noncontingent liquidated
unsecured debts of less than $100,000 and noncontingent liquidated secured debts of less than $350,000. Id.
190. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8) (Supp. IV 1980).
191. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 9.10, at 1595 (J. Moore 14th ed. 1978).
192. In re Martin's Point Ltd., 12 Bankr. 721 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981).
193. See, e.g., In re Los Angeles Land & Invs., Ltd., 282 F. Supp. 454 (D. Hawaii 1968), afid, 447
F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1971).
1982]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
rately for administrative convenience;' 94 more importantly, similar claims
may be classified separately if separate treatment will be afforded under the
plan.' 95 The only express requirement under the Code is that similar claims
classified in the same class receive the same treatment under the plan.19
Principle 3: Claims of a similar nature that are classified differently may be
treated differently, within reason.
As the case law and common sense demonstrate, the primary reason for
separate classification of claims is the debtor's or the creditor's desire to treat
certain claims differently from other, even similar, claims. This reasoning also
has been applied conversely to require separate classification of claims that
will be treated differently under a plan. 97
The power to classify and treat similar claims in different fashions is not
unlimited. Discrimination must be based upon some factual distinctions be-
tween the classes of claims, and the treatment afforded the separate classes
must be reasonable under the circumstances of the case. These limits are
derived from the chapter XI cases that required classification to be "just and
reasonably necessary to effectuate the arrangement."'' 98 The same rule was
enunciated by the Fifth Circuit in the LeBlanc chapter XII case: "As a general
rule, the classification in a plan should not do substantial violence to any
claimant's interest. The plan should not arbitrarily classify or discriminate
against creditors.' 99
Principle 4: Claims of a similar nature may be classified differently and treated
substantially differently when necessary to do equity.
The requirement that a discriminatory classification scheme be just and
reasonable still affords the debtor or its creditors great latitude in constructing
a plan. The possibilities are almost endless, ranging from separate but equal
plans, in which different classes of claims receive different considerations of
equal values, to very discriminatory plans, in which one class of claims re-
ceives a substantial cash dividend while another class receives nothing. The
bankruptcy court sitting as a court in equity will determine whether the
separate classification and treatment are just and reasonable or arbitrary and
discriminatory.
LeBlanc best illustrates this process. Under the chapter XII plan pro-
posed by the secured creditors in the case, general unsecured claims greater
194. 11 U.S.C. § 1122(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
195. See In re Four Seasons Nursing Centers of Am., Inc.,472 F.2d747,749 (10thCir. 1973); Western Mesa
Oil Corp. v. Edlou Co., 143 F.2d 843,845 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 786 (1944); In re Boston Metropolitan
Bldgs., Inc., 92 F. Supp. 843,848 (D. Mass. 1950); In re Burns Bros., 14 F. Supp. 910 (S.D.N.Y. 1936) (divisionof
general unsecured claims into two classes in case under § 77B).
196. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4) (Supp. IV 1980).
197. Kyser v. MacAdam, 117 F.2d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 1941).
198. Bartle v. Markson Bros., Inc., 314 F.2d 303, 305 (2d Cir. 1963) (citing In re Hudson-Ross, Inc., 175 F.
Supp. 111, 114 (N.D. Il. 1959)).
199. In re LeBlanc, 622 F.2d 872, 879 n.9 (5th Cir. 1980).
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than two hundred dollars were divided into two classes. One class received a
forty percent dividend while the other class, composed of claims held by
insiders, received no dividend at all. The court rejected an appeal by one of
the insiders, relying on the difference between the insiders and the trade
creditors who had less knowledge of the status of the debtor's affairs and on
the other insiders' consent to the plan. Significantly, the appellant also
claimed that the plan operated as an equitable subordination of the insider's
claims, in violation of the standards for subordination enunciated in Benjamin
v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Co.)200 and elsewhere. The Fifth Circuit
specifically rejected this claim, holding that the doctrine of equitable sub-
ordination did not apply even though the case reached the same result 201
In re Four Seasons Nursing Centers ofAmerica, Inc.2 2 also illustrates this
principle. The Tenth Circuit upheld a division between shareholders who pur-
chased shares prior to commencement to the chapter X case and shareholders
who purchased their shares during the case. It permitted distribution to the
former class without any distribution to the latter class, holding that "[t]he re-
organization court as a court of equity has broad powers in the matter of
classifying creditors and shareholders, and it necessarily has full power to
subordinate interests or classes of interests where the equities demand."' 20 3
Principle 5: The latitude to provide different treatment to claims of a similar
nature is limited by the probable result on liquidation.
The latitude to construct a plan, in the absence of facts justifying equi-
table subordination of a claim or class of claims, is limited not only by justice
and reason but also by the probable results of liquidation of the chapter 11
debtor.
This outside limit is approached by two separate paths. The indirect path
is suggested by cases such as LeBlanc and Four Seasons, in which the courts
have justified discriminatory treatment of insider creditors and speculator
shareholders on the equitable grounds that the classes receiving nothing under
the plans would have received nothing in liquidation. Therefore, the unpaid
class has not been harmed, even though perhaps more worthy classes of
similar claims or interests receive distributions under the plans.204 The same
reasoning was applied in Palisades, in which refusal to classify secured claims
separately was justified because the objecting creditor would receive almost
three times his own valuation of his security if the plan were consummated
successfully. 20
5
200. 563 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1977).
201. In re LeBlanc, 622 F.2d 872, 879 n.9 (5th Cir. 1980).
202. 472 F.2d 747 (10th Cir. 1973).
203. Id. at 749.
204. In re LeBlanc, 622 F.2d 872, 879 (5th Cir. 1980); In re Four Seasons Nursing Centers of Am., Inc., 472
F.2d747, 750(10thCir. 1973); Continental Ins. Co. v. Louisiana Oil Ref. Corp., 89 F.2d 333,338-39 (5th Cir. 1937).
205. Seidel v. Palisades-on-the-Desplaines (In re Palisades-on-the-Desplaines), 89 F.2d 214, 218 (7th Cir.
1937).
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The direct path is provided by the "best interest of creditors" test of
section 1129(a)(7), which requires either acceptance of the plan by each
holder of a claim or interest in the class or a demonstration that each holder
of a claim or interest will receive under the plan as much as or more than they
would receive in a liquidation under chapter 7 of the Code. Accordingly, a
plan of reorganization under chapter 11 cannot be confirmed if the classifica-
tion and treatment of claims and interests leads a claim or interest holder to
receive less under the plan than it would receive in liquidation.
Martin's Point Ltd.2 6 illustrates this direct path and at the same time
provides a glimpse of the importance of the power to classify. Since the
dissenting creditor was a member of a class and was outvoted on plan con-
firmation, the court was only forced to scrutinize the plan by the best interest
of creditors test. Had the dissenting creditor succeeded in being classified
separately, the court would have been faced with a dissenting class and could
only have confirmed the plan over the objection of the class by the cramdown
provision of section 1129(b). This provision incorporates the more onerous
requirements of determining whether the plan unfairly discriminates and
whether it complies with the long-standing fair and equitable test with respect
to each class of claims. 20 7 This latter test is of particular importance to a
chapter 11 debtor since it requires full payment to the dissenting senior class
before any value in the debtor can be preserved for junior classes or inter-
ests.2"'
VIII. THE EMERGING PITFALLS AND PROBLEMS
These emerging principles of classification still leave substantial room for
future litigation and classification. In particular, the questions of separate but
equal treatment of claims and equitable discrimination between claims are
ready for further development.
The question of separate but equal treatment probably will present fewer
obstacles to bankruptcy courts. It will arise in more complicated reorganiza-
tions, which will present greater opportunities to distribute different forms of
consideration, such as notes, stock, or options, of roughly equal value. Al-
though the desirability of some consideration will be greater than others (e.g.,
cash is better than notes, and notes are better than stock), courts probably
will support separate but equal plans if accepted by the separate classes of
claim or interest holders. These plans will not violate the principle of equality
among creditors, and in addition, the necessity of majority acceptance of the
plans will protect against some serious abuses.2°
206. See supra text accompanying notes 27-33.
207. See Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 133 (1979).
208. See Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
209. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8) (Supp. IV 1980).
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CHAPTER 11 REORGANIZATIONS
The question of equitable discrimination between claims will be con-
siderably more thorny. On the one hand, the courts will be sympathetic to the
consensual reallocation of assets and rights when a majority of affected claim
and interest holders have accepted the reorganization plan. This natural in-
clination to approve settlement agreements will be bolstered by the necessity
to demonstrate that all affected parties are receiving as much as or more than
they would receive in liquidation. On the other hand, the possibilities for
abuses in the classification process, the voting process, and the liquidation
analysis are very great, which should lead courts to balance their interest in
successful reorganizations with a measure of respect for the principle of
equality of treatment for creditors. The unclear reasoning that runs through
many of the chapter 13 cases underscores this problem, without suggesting an
immediate solution.
Regardless of whatever direction Congress or the courts will provide to
courts, debtors, and creditors, the dynamic tension between the principle of
equality and the practical politics of reorganizations will not, and cannot,
simply go away. Both policies will remain ingrained in reorganization law for
years to come.
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